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Game Theory A Modeling Approach

Models and Games INTRODUCTION TO MODELING INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY EXAMPLES OF GAMES RATIONALITY ASSUMPTION Player Preferences ORDINAL UTILITIES VON NEUMANNMORGENSTERN UTILITIES CONSTRUCTING UTILITIES DETERMINING RISK Simultaneous Play STRATEGIC GAMES FINAL JEOPARDY MIXED STRATEGIES NONMATRIX MODELS LIMITATIONS Bilateral Agreements NEGOTIATIONS BARGAINING IN STRATEGIC GAMES FAIRNESS PROPERTIES Sequential Play SEQUENTIAL GAMES SUBGAME PERFECT EQUILIBRIA COMBINATORIAL GAMES MORAL HAZARD Missing Information IMPERFECT INFORMATION ROMANS AND GERMANS INCOMPLETE INFORMATION BARGAINING GAMES WITH PRIVATE INFORMATION INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATION AUCTIONS Repetitious Play REPEATED SOCIAL DILEMMAS MODELING NOISE EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY Multilateral Agreements SHAPLEY ARGUMENT NUCLEOLUS ARGUMENT BARGAINING ARGUMENT VOTING POWER Resource Allocation RESOURCE ALLOCATION PROBLEM BARGAINING AND COALITION MODELS COMPLETE AND INCOMPLETE INFORMATION MODELS CONCLUDING REMARKS

ใส่ตะกร้า
  • ISBN9781482248098
  • ประเภท E-Book
  • ผู้แต่ง Richard Alan Gillman
  • สำนักพิมพ์ CRC
  • ครั้งที่พิมพ์ 1
  • ปีที่พิมพ์2019
  • ภาษาภาษาอังกฤษ
  • หมวดหมู่วิทยาศาสตร์
: ข้อมูลหนังสือ

Models and Games INTRODUCTION TO MODELING INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY EXAMPLES OF GAMES RATIONALITY ASSUMPTION Player Preferences ORDINAL UTILITIES VON NEUMANNMORGENSTERN UTILITIES CONSTRUCTING UTILITIES DETERMINING RISK Simultaneous Play STRATEGIC GAMES FINAL JEOPARDY MIXED STRATEGIES NONMATRIX MODELS LIMITATIONS Bilateral Agreements NEGOTIATIONS BARGAINING IN STRATEGIC GAMES FAIRNESS PROPERTIES Sequential Play SEQUENTIAL GAMES SUBGAME PERFECT EQUILIBRIA COMBINATORIAL GAMES MORAL HAZARD Missing Information IMPERFECT INFORMATION ROMANS AND GERMANS INCOMPLETE INFORMATION BARGAINING GAMES WITH PRIVATE INFORMATION INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATION AUCTIONS Repetitious Play REPEATED SOCIAL DILEMMAS MODELING NOISE EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY Multilateral Agreements SHAPLEY ARGUMENT NUCLEOLUS ARGUMENT BARGAINING ARGUMENT VOTING POWER Resource Allocation RESOURCE ALLOCATION PROBLEM BARGAINING AND COALITION MODELS COMPLETE AND INCOMPLETE INFORMATION MODELS CONCLUDING REMARKS