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The Philosophy of Group Polarization: Epistemology, Metaphysics, Psychology

Group polarization―the tendency of groups to incline toward more extreme positions than initially held by their individual members―has been rigorously studied by social psychologists, though in a way that has overlooked important philosophical questions. This is the first book-length treatment of group polarization from a philosophical perspective. The phenomenon of group polarization raises several important metaphysical and epistemological questions. From a metaphysical point of view, can group polarization, understood as an epistemic feature of a group, be reduced to epistemic features of its individual members? Relatedly, from an epistemological point of view, is group polarization best understood as a kind of cognitive bias or rather in terms of intellectual vice? This book compares four models that combine potential answers to the metaphysical and epistemological questions. The models considered are: group polarization as (i) a collective bias; (ii) a summation of individual epistemic vices; (iii) a summation of individual biases; and (iv) a collective epistemic vice. Ultimately, the authors defend a collective vice model of group polarization over the competing alternatives.

ใส่ตะกร้า
  • ISBN9780367901011
  • ประเภท E-Book
  • ผู้แต่ง Fernando Broncano-Berrocal
  • สำนักพิมพ์ Routledge
  • ครั้งที่พิมพ์
  • ปีที่พิมพ์2021
  • ภาษาภาษาอังกฤษ
  • หมวดหมู่ศาสนา/ปรัชญา
: ข้อมูลหนังสือ

Group polarization―the tendency of groups to incline toward more extreme positions than initially held by their individual members―has been rigorously studied by social psychologists, though in a way that has overlooked important philosophical questions. This is the first book-length treatment of group polarization from a philosophical perspective. The phenomenon of group polarization raises several important metaphysical and epistemological questions. From a metaphysical point of view, can group polarization, understood as an epistemic feature of a group, be reduced to epistemic features of its individual members? Relatedly, from an epistemological point of view, is group polarization best understood as a kind of cognitive bias or rather in terms of intellectual vice? This book compares four models that combine potential answers to the metaphysical and epistemological questions. The models considered are: group polarization as (i) a collective bias; (ii) a summation of individual epistemic vices; (iii) a summation of individual biases; and (iv) a collective epistemic vice. Ultimately, the authors defend a collective vice model of group polarization over the competing alternatives.